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INTRODUCTION
Suppose two people both owned money making machines. Person A’s
machine consumes one emission allowance at a time and generates $275.
Person B’s machine consumes one allowance and generates $300.
Wouldn’t we want our legal system to remove any obstacles that would
prevent Person A from selling his allowances to Person B?
The capital gains tax presents just such an obstacle to firms that
participate in the market for sulfur dioxide emissions allowances. Since
firms that are allocated allowances by the government don’t have to pay for
them, the allowances are recorded as having a cost of zero dollars. This
means that the first time an allowance is sold, the firm selling it has to pay
capital gains tax on the entire sales price. This can prevent firms that are
allocated allowances from selling them to other firms that could put them to
better use.
The cap-and-trade program established by Title IV of the Clean Air Act
is based on a pragmatic idea. Since a certain amount of pollution is
inevitable, the program aims to (1) keep pollution to a reasonable level and
(2) make sure that society gets the most benefit out of each ton of pollution
emitted. The overall cap on emissions ensures that the first condition will
hold, while the efficient operation of the market is supposed to provide the
second.
If the market is not operating efficiently, it means that some firms are
emitting sulfur dioxide even though other firms could get more value out of
the same amount of emissions. It also means that the market is not
providing observers with accurate information about abatement costsneutralizing one of the useful side effects of the emissions market.
An inefficient market imposes unnecessary compliance costs on the
power industry. To the extent that environmental regulations are restrained
by the costs that regulations impose on industry, this will lead to
unnecessarily lax emissions restrictions. Making the market more efficient
will allow the imposition of tighter standards.
This Article attempts to provide an overview of the sulfur dioxide
emissions market, with an eye for how it could be improved. This
information can be used to improve the performance of the sulfur dioxide
allowance market, or incorporated into new emissions allowance markets to
improve their operation. Part I of this Article provides background
information on the creation and operation of the sulfur dioxide emissions
market. Part II reports and analyzes data regarding the actual behavior of
the market from 1995 to 2003. Part III engages in an economic analysis of
the interaction between the emissions allowance market and the power
industry. Part IV then identifies and describes some barriers to efficient
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trading.
Finally, Part V will explore potential solutions to the problems caused
by the capital gains tax. The capital gains tax makes selling allowances less
desirable, and any solution to the problem must neutralize that effect. This
Article will eventually suggest that charging a fee to companies that redeem
never-traded allowances is the most practical solution.

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SULFUR DIOXIDE MARKET
A. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
Congress passed several major amendments to the Clean Air Act in
1990. 1 The most innovative- and controversial- of these amendments was
Title IV, which introduced a market based approach to controlling the
pollutants that form the key components of acid rain: sulfur dioxide and
nitrous oxide.2 This Article will focus on the Act’s treatment of sulfur
dioxide and its consequences.
The key innovation of the sulfur dioxide program was that it created
tradable emission allowances, subject to an overall cap.3 This replaced the
previous program, which mandated that all non-grandfathered utilities emit
sulfur dioxide at a specified rate per million BTUs generated.4 Under the
system of emission allowances, a firm’s sole obligation is to have sufficient
allowances to cover its total annual emissions.5
This change in focus gives firms an economic incentive to reduce
emissions as far as is practical, instead of simply reducing by the minimum
necessary to comply with the law. Any reduction in emitted sulfur dioxide
allows the abating firm to sell excess allowances on the private market, or
avoid purchasing allowances in the first place.
Title IV implemented this cap and trade approach in two phases.6 In
Phase I (lasting from 1995 to 2000) only certain targeted power plants were
subject to the cap.7 Under Phase II, almost all power generating units must
comply with the cap.8
1
See generally Brian L. Farrel, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 And the Use of Market Forces to
Control Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235 (1991).
2
42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2004).
3
See Jonathan Nash & Richard Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to
Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 582 (2001) (discussing the sulfur dioxide trading
market).
4
Or that they use a prescribed technology, which amounts to the same thing. See generally Bruce Ackerman
& Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (critiquing the then existing
regulatory regime).
5
42 U.S.C. § 7651c-d (2004).
6
See 42 U.S.C. § 7651a (28) (2004) (defining the beginning of Phase II).
7
42 U.S.C. § 7651c (2004). The list of targeted plants is in Table A of 42 U.S.C. § 7651c (e) (2004).
8
42 U.S.C. § 7651d (2004).
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Phase I was marked by significant over-compliance.9 The amount of
allowances issued each year varied significantly, as utilities received bonus
allowances for installing scrubbers and non-targeted firms’ voluntary
participation in the program varied.10 However, total emissions were well
under the cap every year.11 Firms anticipated that allowances would
become much more valuable under Phase II (as the number of emissions
sources regulated would be dramatically increased without a corresponding
increase the cap) and engaged in speculation by reducing emissions farther
than the law mandated.12
By the time Phase II began, firms had banked more than ten million tons
of sulfur dioxide emissions allowances.13 They have drawn down on those
savings in order to cushion the impact of the more stringent cap in Phase
II.14 This prevented the price of pollution allowances from skyrocketing as
the program transitioned from Phase I to Phase II.15 Under Phase II the
EPA allocates approximately 8.95 million tons of emission allowances to
firms for each vintage year.16 The EPA also issues special allowances for
various reasons,17 and the total amount of emission allowances issued for
each year has been about 9.5 million tons.18
Firms aren’t limited to trading active (retireable) allowances, but may
also trade future allowances. The EPA gives a firm that is allocated X tons
of annual allowances X vintage-2000 allowances, X vintage-2001
allowances, X vintage-2002 allowances, and so forth.19 Allowances can be
retired to cover sulfur dioxide emitted in the year of their vintage, or banked
and later retired to cover emissions for any year afterwards.20
The mechanics of the allowance system are simple. The EPA maintains
an Allowance Tracking System, which tracks the ownership of all existing
sulfur dioxide allowances.21 Firms are required to report all allowance
9
The EPA maintains a computerized database tracking allowance retirement information. This statement is
supported by data pulled from that database. I’m not sure exactly how to cite to this, so let’s just say: hereinafter
“EPA Retired Allowances Database.”
10
The rules regarding the variable credit allocations are specified in 42 U.S.C. § 7651c (b). The variable
credit issuance itself is visible in the EPA Retired Allowances Database.
11
EPA Retired Allowances Database.
12
Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation
of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.309, 325 (2001).
13
EPA Retired Allowances Database.
14
EPA Retired Allowances Database; EPA Compliance Report 2002, page 2, available at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/cmprpt/arp02/2002report.pdf.
15
EPA Compliance Report 2002, page 6 actually shows prices going down from the end of 1999 to mid2000.
16
42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2004). Exceptions to this (bonus allocations) are discussed in 42 U.S.C. § 7651c (b)
(2004).
17
42 U.S.C. § 7651d (a) (2), (a) (3) (2004) provide for bonus allocations.
18
The existence of these excess allowances can again be seen in the EPA Retired Allowances Database.
19
42 U.S.C. § 7651a (3) (2004) provides that allowances are tied to a particular calendar year.
20
42 U.S.C. § 7651a (3) (2004) states that an allowance authorizes an emission “during or after” (emphasis
added) a specified calendar year.
21
The Allowance Tracking System is mandated in 42 U.S.C. § 7651 b (a) (1) (d) (2004).
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transfers to the EPA, which then updates the Allowance Tracking System.22
The Title IV cap and trade program has been a success by any measure.
Sulfur dioxide emissions in 2002 were down more than 40% from their
1980 levels (and down 35% and 14% from 1990 and 1995, respectively),23
and these reductions have been achieved at a surprisingly low cost.24 Of
course, the system could still be made to work better.
B. Market Participants
Power generating companies directly own forty five percent of the
allowances that have been banked from previous years.25 Allowance
brokers hold the vast majority of the remaining credits. Some of these
allowances are being held for individuals, while some are being held for
power companies (as it is easier for some firms to trade through brokers
than to trade directly with other firms).26 Power companies retired the vast
majority of allowances that have been retired over the course of the
emissions trading program,27 and power companies own almost all of the
allowances for future vintage years.
Accordingly, when this Article refers to participants in the sulfur
dioxide allowances market, it is generally referring to power plants. While
the behavior of outside investors and environmentalists is interesting, it
does not have a noticeable effect on the market as a whole.
Power companies have been one of the most heavily regulated groups of
companies in the United States ever since the collapse of several power
generating pyramid schemes in the 1930s.28 Many plants’ top levels of
management were and are comprised of a publicly elected board.29 States
have recently started to move towards deregulating power generation,
22
42 U.S.C. § 7651b (a) (1) (d) (1) specifies that allowance transfers are finalized after they are recorded in
the Allowance Tracking System.
23
EPA Compliance Report from 2002.
24
See generally A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program (2000)
(evaluating the impact of Title IV on sulfur dioxide emissions)
25
EPA Annual Compliance Data, obtained from an EPA official. This might appear to be a low percentage.
However, most firms that trade allowances will trade them through a broker, in the same way that most
individuals who trade stock holdings generally trade through a broker instead of actually attempting to sell
physical copies of stock certificates to other investments.
In addition, it makes sense that most of the allowances that are traded remain banked, rather than being
retired. This is because of the tax treatment of allowances- an allowance that has been sold has a cost basis of its
sales price, so that future sales of that allowance will incur less of a tax liability than would selling an allowance
that has never been traded. Accordingly, a firm with a choice between the two will choose to retire the allowance
that has never been traded.
Also, keep in mind that the currently banked allowances represent less than 10% of all of the 2003 and
earlier vintage year allowances issued.
26
Source: Interviews with EPA officials.
27
EPA Retired Allowances Database.
28
For a historical look at utility regulation, see 2 Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles
and Institutions (1971).
29
See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN ENVTL. L.J. 300, 333 (1995)
(discussing some of the obstacles that this regulation can create for allowances transactions).
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which should have interesting side effects on plant participation in the
market for allowances. Unfortunately, a full survey of the current state of
the power industry is beyond the scope of this Article.

C. Summary of Available Pollution Reduction Methods
This section provides a brief description of the methods available to
power plants to reduce their sulfur dioxide emissions. It’s easier to predict
how firms will behave when we understand some of the physical constraints
under which they operate.
1. Use of Low-Sulfur Coal
Most coal-fired plants can retrofit their boilers to handle bituminous
low-sulfur coal for a very low cost30 (typically between $5 and $10 per kW
of capacity). The main cost involved in switching to the lower sulfur coal is
the increased cost of the coal itself.31 Since bituminous low-sulfur coal
(mostly from the east coast) is less common than high-sulfur bituminous
coal, lower sulfur coals command a price premium.32
Since the market in emissions allowances began operating, sulfur
content has become a factor priced in to the cost of coal.33 Where the
market was previously divided into “high sulfur” and “low sulfur” coal, the
emphasis that the Clean Air Act put on making every ton of emissions count
created a gradient of types of coals, with the price increasing as the sulfur
content decreases.34 Some plants were able to reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions significantly simply by switching from high sulfur to medium
sulfur coal.35
Switching to a lower sulfur coal is also the emission abatement method
with the shortest lead time. While installing scrubbers takes eighteen to
thirty months from the time that the installation decision is made,36 firms
can switch to low sulfur coal as quickly as they can renegotiate their fuel
supply contract.

30

Swift, supra note 12, at 338.
In 2003, low sulfur coal carried between an $.86 and $3.32 premium per ton of coal used. Energy
Information Administration Annual Energy Outlook report, supplemental table 112, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/supplement/pdf/suptab_112.pdf (hereinafter Coal Price Report).
32
Id.
33
Swift, supra note 12, at 339.
34
Id.
35
Swift, supra note 12, at 337.
36
Swift, supra note 12, at 331.
31
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2. Use of Extra Low-Sulfur Subbituminous Coal
Subbituminous coal mined in the western United States has extremely
low sulfuric content (at or below .6 lb/mmBtu, compared with 1.2
lb/mmBtu for Appalachian low-sulfur coal).37 However, the nature of the
coal makes it more difficult to burn than eastern bituminous coals, requiring
more extensive retrofitting of existing plants (typically costing between $50
to $75 per kW of capacity).38 The subbituminous coal is mined in large
quantities from Idaho and Montana, so once the retrofit is complete ongoing
costs are relatively minor.39 This makes using this type of coal a sort of
halfway step between switching to low sulfur bituminous coal and installing
scrubbers.
In addition, some firms have experimented with burning mixes of
subbituminous and bituminous coals.40 This requires less extensive capital
investment and still results in lowered sulfur dioxide emissions.41
3. Installation of Flue Gas Scrubbers
Flue gas desulfurization, or “scrubbing,” is a technology that uses
chemical reactions to remove sulfur dioxide from the smoke produced by a
power plant before releasing it into the environment.42 Scrubbers are
expensive to install, but are cheap to operate once in place.43 The low
operating costs make scrubbers a good abatement solution for large plants,
while the high installation costs make scrubbers impractical for smaller
plants (unless the price of an allowance is very high).
Since the beginning of the cap and trade program, scrubber costs have
been going down.44 Improvements in scrubber technology have been driven
by competition with other emission reduction methods and by the changed
emphasis of the Clean Air Act.45
Under the previous regime, some firms were simply required to
maintain a low rate of emissions per unit of power generated.46 The only
way to meet this standard was by installing scrubbers. Accordingly,
scrubber manufacturers did not have to worry about plants switching to an
alternative method of emission reduction. Under the Clean Air Act today,
37

Swift, supra note 12, at 336.
Swift, supra note 12, at 336, 338.
39
Sub-bituminous coal from the Powder Basin/Green River area cost only $7.09 per ton in 2003, compared
with a price of $29 to $35 per ton for Eastern low sulfur coals. Coal Price Report.
40
Swift, supra note 12, at 392-93.
41
Id.
42
Ellerman et al, supra note 22, at 241-242.
43
Id.
44
Swift, supra note 12, at 332.
45
Swift, supra note 12, at 333-34.
46
See Swift, supra note 12, at 334.
38
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of course, this is no longer the case.
The pre-1995 Clean Air Act also enacted heavy fines for any violation
of the rate restrictions.47 This meant that scrubbers had to be extremely
reliable, which lead to excessive built in redundancy.48 Under the cap and
trade program, companies that build scrubbers focus on removing as much
sulfur dioxide as possible as cheaply as possible.49 The removal of excess
redundancy has helped to lower the installation and operating costs
associated with scrubbers.50
4. Reduction in or Relocation of Electricity Generation
Firms can always reduce emissions by reducing the amount of
electricity that they generate. This can be a very expensive proposition,
especially for plants that are already using relatively clean power generation
technology.
One cost effective way of reducing emissions is to relocate electricity
generation. Several firms have reduced their total emissions by reducing
the amount of electricity generated at smaller, dirtier plants and making up
the difference at larger plants that use clean power generation technology,
like scrubbers.51
II. OBSERVED BEHAVIOR IN THE PRIVATE ALLOWANCE MARKET
The data in this section come from an electronic database maintained by
the EPA that tracks allowance retirement. I have used standard database
tools to aggregate and separate out useful information.
Caution must be exercised when drawing conclusions from this data.
Because the market in Phase I was so different from the market in Phase II,
we really have two separate data sets of five years and four years,
respectively. Five years of data are not enough to allow us to claim strong
statistical inferences. This Part will only use the data to add support for
theories about how the market works, or to reject theories that are clearly
contradicted by the observed data.
A. Price and Emission History
1. Phase I

47

Swift, supra note 12, at 334.
Id.
Swift, supra note 12, at 335.
50
Id.
51
Swift, supra note 12, at 333.
48
49
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a. Tracking Total Emissions
The first four years of the sulfur dioxide market system were marked by
reduction far beyond the minimum cap requirements. The following table
describes the number of allowances available and the number of allowances
retired each year:52

Issued
Previously Banked
Total Available
Total Retired

1995
8772768
0
8772768
4928312

1996
8265104
3844456
12109560
5300861

1997
7101605
6808699
13910304
5441547

1998
6952813
8468757
15421570
5452943

1999
6148527
9968627
16117154
5359147

After a slight jump from 1995 to 1996 the number of allowances being
retired each year remained fairly constant at a level well below the number
of allowances issued each year. Because of this, a large number of
allowances built up in the bank. We can see from the table that the large
number of allowances in the bank did not lead to more sulfur dioxide being
emitted.
The following table compares the prices of emission allowances (in
nominal dollars) from year to year:53

January Price
July Price
December Price
Allowances Retired

1995
140
135
100
4928312

1996
100
75
100
5300861

1997
100
90
100
5441547

1998
100
200
210
5452943

1999
210
190
130
5359147

As Part III explains, economic theory would predict an inverse
relationship between the price of an allowance and the amount of sulfur
dioxide emitted. This table provides some support for such a theory, or at
least does not contradict it. As prices stayed constant (declining slightly in
real value due to inflation) emissions showed only a slight increase, while
the year after the prices went up less of sulfur dioxide was emitted. The
abnormally low amount emitted in 1995 is probably due to the fact that the
consensus estimate before the start of the cap and trade program for the
price for a one-ton emission allowance was around $300.54 Firms had made
52

EPA Retired Allowances Database.
Retirement volume is from EPA Retired Allowances Database. Market prices pulled from the 2002 EPA
Compliance Report.
54
Swift, supra note 12, at 331.
53
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plans and installed equipment based on that number that led to low
emissions in 1995 and, to a lesser extent, in 1996.55
This table also suggests that firms do not react quickly to changes in
price. While prices shot up in 1998, sulfur dioxide emissions didn’t start to
go down until 1999.
b. Tracking Autarchic Behavior
Phase I was also marked by heavily autarchic56 behavior. That is, firms
met most of their emissions obligations by retiring allowances that had
originally been allocated to them, rather than by retiring allowances that
they bought from a different firm. The following table measures such
behavior:57

Total Retired
Autarchic Allowances
Autarchic Percentage

1995
5359147
4190664
78.2

1996
5452943
4054370
74.4

1997
5441547
3720455
68.4

1998
5300861
3709535
70

This shows, for example, that in 1995, of the 5.36 million allowances
retired, 4.19 million were retired by the same firm to which the government
initially allocated them. The percentage of allowances retired in this matter
went down over time, but never dropped much below seventy percent. This
means that seventy percent of the allowances used each year were never
traded on the open market. In turn, this means that the price generated by
the market was based on trades involving the other thirty percent.58
c. Tracking Retirement by Vintage
Emission allowances are issued with a particular vintage year.59
Allowances with a vintage of year N can be used to cover emissions for
year N or for any year afterwards, but can not be used to cover emissions
liability for years before N.60
55

See id.
Autarchy is defined by Merriam-Webster as a policy of self-sufficiency and independence. In this
context, a firm behaves autarchically when it complies with emissions requirements by using its own allowancesthat is, without trading on the market. Autarchic allowances are those allowances retired by the firm to which
they were originally allocated.
57
EPA Retired Allowances Database.
58
Or by trades involving allowances that were banked for future use. Unfortunately, data on the ownership
of banked allowances is not readily available. This is ameliorated to a certain extent by the fact that banked
allowances are counted (as either autarchic or non-autarchic) when they are eventually retired- the current total of
7.7 million banked allowances represent only 10% of 2003 and earlier vintage allowances.
59
42 U.S.C. § 7651a (3) (2004).
60
Id.
56

1999
4928312
3499133
71
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This table tracks vintage retirement rates by year:61

Vintage
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Issued
8772768
8265104
7101605
6952813
6148527

1999
65719
306111
698802
1212504
2645176

Retirement Year
1998
1997
209298
619389
963555
1882966
1359827
2939192
2768181

1996
1486242
3966701

1995
5359147

This table shows, for example, that 1,486,242 vintage-1995 allowances
were retired in 1996.
There is a consistent pattern of firms redeeming banked allowances
from past years, even as they are banking allowances from the current year
at a tremendous rate. This probably results from firms treating allowances
as interchangeable once they can be retired to cover emissions obligations.62
2. Phase II
a. Tracking Total Emissions
Phase II of the sulfur dioxide trading program involved many more
sources of pollution, while the cap on the number of allowances issued each
year remained about the same.63 In addition, there was no longer any
reason to hoard credits- firms did not expect a dramatic increase in future
demand in the way that they expected demand to increase from Phase I to
Phase II.64 Accordingly, companies began to retire some of their banked
credits:65

Issued
Previously Banked
Total Available
Total Retired

61

2000
9879565
10758007
20637572
11042240

2001
9547229
9595332
19142561
10629830

2002
9535636
8512731
18048367
10192991

2003
9535906
7855376
17391282
10577783

EPA Retired Allowances Database.
As, in fact, they are, per 42 U.S.C. § 7651a (3) (2004).
42 U.S.C. § 7651d details the additional utilities covered under Phase II (compared with the table of
affected units in Phase I in Table A at 42 U.S.C. § 7651 c (e). The constant level of allowance issuance can be
seen in the EPA Compliance Report for 2002.
64
Though this may change, if the Clear Skies Act, S.1844, 108th Cong. (2003) passes, as it would
dramatically reduce the number of available allowances, as documented in § 43.
65
EPA Retired Allowances Database
62
63
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Again, we can see that the number of allowances retired each year do
not correlate well with the total number of allowances available to be
retired. If there were a strong relationship between existing allowances and
total emissions then we would not see emissions change in different
directions from year to year (down from 2000-01 and 2001-02, and up from
2002-03) while the number of available allowances steadily decreased. We
must look elsewhere for an explanation of firms’ behavior.
The table comparing emission allowance prices (in nominal dollars)
with total emissions shows a correlation:66

January Price
July Price
December Price
Total Retired

2000
130
150
160
11042240

2001
160
200
170
10629830

2002
170
150
140
10192991

2003
140
170
210
10577783

We see again that lower beginning of year allowance costs lead to lower
overall emissions. We also again see a delayed reaction to price inputsalthough allowance prices were falling throughout 2002, firms didn’t start
emitting more sulfur dioxide until 2003.67
b. Tracking Autarchic Behavior
Autarchic behavior was less prevalent in Phase II than it was in Phase I,
but remained common:68

Total Retired
Autarchic Allowances
Autarchic Percentage

2000
11042240
6485185
58.7

2001
10629830
6465461
60.8

2002
10192991
6272849
61.5

2003
10577783
6293865
59.5

The proportion of allowances retired by their original owners has
remained fairly close to sixty percent throughout Phase II.
This is ten
percentage points lower than the autarchy rate observed during Phase I.
This is probably due to some change in the makeup of the market from
Phase I to Phase II. It’s possible that the larger number of participating
firms led to a more efficient market, leading to less hoarding and more use
of externally acquired credits.
66

EPA Retired Allowances Database.
Editors: there is a chart in the EPA Compliance Report for 2002 on page 6 that provides more solid
support for this statement. I hope to get permission to reprint it here.
68
EPA Retired Allowances Database
67
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Another explanation focuses on the existence of intra-firm trading.
Allowances are allocated on a plant-by- plant basis. Since many firms own
multiple plants, they may choose to move allowances from a clean plant (or
a plant that is easier to make clean) to a dirty plant. Firms could accomplish
the same thing indirectly by reducing power production at their dirty plants
and increasing it at their clean plants. Taking advantage of these sorts of
opportunities allows firms to avoid using the market without sacrificing too
much efficiency.
Small firms don’t have this option. Firms that own only one or two
plants must use the market. If their plants are clean, they have to use the
market in order to get any benefit from their excess allowances. If their
plants are dirty, they have to use the market in order to obtain allowances to
cover their emissions obligations. Since Phase I only involved certain
targeted plants,69 while Phase II covers all coal fired power producers,70 it
seems reasonable to believe that Phase II simply includes more small firms
that do not have the option of autarchic compliance.
c. Tracking Retirement by Vintage
It can also be helpful to break down each year’s retired allowances by
their original vintage, to get some idea of the magnitude of the intertemporal trading71 going on. Remember, an allowance may be retired to
cover an emission obligation at any point after its vintage year, but not
before.72 Here is the table:73

Vintage
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
69

Issued
8772768
8265104
7101605
6952813
6148527
9879565
9547229
9535636

2003
66055
99958
176799
174192
366770
389769
727742
1754162

Retirement Year
2002
2001
143697
109105
220855
308151
307517
552628
460568
708858
682957
782897
595248
1746575
1404220
6421616
6377929

2000
470358
387309
838757
1152455
1915984
6277377

As enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 7651c (e) Table A.
As described in 42 U.S.C. § 7651d (a) (1), and elaborated upon at great length in § 7651d (b), (c), (d), (e),
(f), (g), and (h).
71
Economists often refer to banking as intertemporal trading (as in the working article by A. Denny
Ellerman and Juan-Pablo Montero, The Temporal Efficiency of SO2 Emissions Trading, available at
http://www.mit.edu/afs/athena/org/c/ceepr/www/2002-003.pdf). The idea is that a firm is essentially trading an
allowance from its past self to its future self. The lay person might refer to this as “saving,” which simply shows a
lack of appreciation for the insight that one acquires with a PhD in Economics.
72
See 42 U.S.C. § 7651a (3) (2004).
73
EPA Retired Allowances Database.
70
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This table shows that throughout Phase II firms have banked allowances
from the current year while retiring allowances from previous years. This
provides more documentation for the tendency we saw in Phase I for firms
to treat retireable allowances of different vintages as interchangeable.

B. Autarchic Behavior
1. Breakdown of Sources of Retired Credits
This section will examine the sources from which firms obtained
allowances to cover their emissions liabilities. This analysis does not
consider the total trading volume in the market- it considers the number of
unique allowances that were ever traded on the market. The year-by- year
results are in the following table:74
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Credits Retired
5359147
5452943
5441547
5300861
4928312
11042240
10629830
10192991
10577783

% Autarchic
78.2
74.4
68.4
70
71
58.7
60.8
61.5
59.5

% Aut. Same Yr.
78.2
55.5
45.4
43
46.3
46
47.3
48.8
47.1

% Aut. Prev Yr.
0
18.9
23
27
24.7
12.8
13.5
12.8
12.4

This table gives the total number of allowances retired each year, and
the percentage of them that were redeemed by the same firm to which they
were originally allocated. It then breaks the autarchic allowances into two
categories: allowances with a vintage year the same as the year that they
were redeemed, and allowances from a previous vintage.
A certain amount of autarchic behavior is inevitable. After all, the firms
that have had credits allocated to them will continue to produce power, and
will emit a certain amount of sulfur dioxide. It is perfectly reasonable for
them to hold back a certain amount of allowances to cover those
emissions.75
74

EPA Retired Allowances Database.
In addition, we would expect firms to favor retiring untraded allowances over traded allowances, for tax
reasons. See infra note 25.
75
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However, we should still look for systemic incentives that prevent firms
from selling all of the allowances that they would sell in an efficient market.
Under ideal conditions, the initial allocation would be irrelevant- given low
transaction costs, emission allowances would find their way to the high cost
avoiders.76 However, as will be discussed in section IV, there are several
reasons to believe that conditions are not ideal and that firms are not
reducing emissions in the most efficient possible manner.
For now, it is worth noting the high percentage of allowances that are
never available on the market (although it is possible that some of the
credits marked as autarchic within the table above had actually been sold
and then purchased back by the original firm, it is unlikely given the capital
gains tax that would be incurred by such a transaction). Apparently, while
annual trading volumes were high,77 that volume consisted of a relatively
small number of allowances being traded back and forth.78
2. Strange Banking Behavior
Another fact apparent in the table above is that a significant number of
the never-traded allowances that firms retired had been carried over from
the previous year. This is counterintuitive- if a firm reduced its emissions
sufficiently to carry some of its allotment over into the next year, it would
be a little surprising to see them have to tap into that bank the next year.
However, we saw from the table in II.A.1.c that firms do not collectively
retire all of the current year’s allowances before beginning to retire
allowances from previous years. Accordingly, some firms were probably
just retiring allowances from the previous year while banking allowances
from this year.
What is odd is that firms carry around excess allowances in the bank in
the first place. Once a firm has reduced its annual emission total below its
annual allowance allocation, it does not have any pressing business need to
keep the extra allowances around. Even if the cap were overly lenient,
leading to a lot of excess allowances, it doesn’t make sense for power
generating firms to be the ones holding on to the extra allowances. Holding
on to them is pure financial speculation.79
This behavior could be motivated either by a widespread belief within
76
This is a fairly straightforward application of Coase’s Theorem, as developed in Ronald Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
77
30.8 million allowances were traded between unrelated entities, according to Swift, supra note 12, at 341.
78
Again, the unique credits being traded around could include those that were banked at the end of each
year. However, such allowances must eventually be retired and thus recorded as either autarchic or non-autarchic.
The number of currently outstanding (banked and therefore non-classified) allowances represent only 10% of the
total number of 2003 and earlier vintage allowances issued.
79
In an analogous situation, airlines keep a certain amount of oil (and options to purchase oil in the future) in
reserve (as their business is highly sensitive to changes in the price of oil). However, airlines do not hold
amounts beyond that needed to protect their core business.
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the industry that prices are going up or by inefficiencies within the market.
The idea of widespread belief in a price increase doesn’t make sense- if
everybody thought prices should be higher, then prices would be higher.
Accordingly, we should examine the market to identify factors that could be
creating inefficiencies. But first, we should establish a framework for
understanding the market so that we can recognize problems when we see
them.
III. MODELING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ALLOWANCE MARKET AND
FIRM BEHAVIOR
The goal of this part of the Article is to provide a framework for
understanding the behavior of participants in the sulfur dioxide emissions
market. Most of this analysis should also be applicable to other types of
emissions trading markets, allowing for differences in costs and types of
abatement technology.
The first section discusses the ways that the market can affect the
emissions behavior of power plants. This becomes important in Part V as
we explore how market participants’ behavior will change given various
possible changes in the rules for how the market works.
The next section examines the way that real world constraints affect the
market price of allowances (and thus, emissions levels). It will do this by
attempting to model the supply and demand curves that are driving the
market. I make no claims to any sort of precision in deriving these curves.
However, even a vague idea of the shape of the demand curve helps to
constrain our predictions about the future to a plausible range and gives us a
valuable starting point for figuring out how new rules and technologies
could affect the behavior of the market.
A. Market Effects on Power Plant Behavior
Many articles have been written about the ways that the Clean Air Act
has modified polluter behavior. The Act does so, of course, through the
market’s influence on firms. This section will attempt to explain how firms
react to changes in market prices.
1. Allowance Prices and Abatement Costs Drive Abatement Expenditures
Each firm on the market should abate emissions until the cost of abating
another ton of sulfur dioxide is equal to the market price for a one-ton
emission allowance. If the cost of the next ton of abatement were higher
than the market price, then the firm should have purchased an additional
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allowance instead of abating the emission. Conversely, if the cost of the
next ton of abatement were lower than the market price, then the firm with
the low abatement costs should continue to abate pollution until it could no
longer profit from doing so- that is, until the marginal costs lined up.
This relationship is complicated by the real world issues associated with
the use of an allowance. Since the firm doesn’t have to settle up its account
with the EPA until the end of the year, they have to guess what the future
value of an allowance will be when making their decisions regarding
emissions. Although the current price would reflect the best estimate of the
future price in an efficient market, the actual market in allowances does not
seem to be that efficient- looking at the historical prices of allowances, they
jump around a lot more than we would expect if market participants were
good at predicting the future.
Additionally, firms are not able to change their sulfur dioxide emissions
instantly in response to changes in market price. Switching to lower sulfur
coal may be delayed by the existence of a long term supply contract, while
other methods of emission abatement (such as the installation of scrubbers)
require long term capital improvements to the plant.80
The other factor that could cause firms to fail to comply with this
principle is that some of them simply might not be rational profitmaximizers. The next Part will examine this issue in more detail.
2. Allowance Prices and Profits Derived From Emissions Drive Emissions
Decisions
Firms should also continue emitting sulfur dioxide until the profit they
gain from emitting another ton is less than the market price for an
allowance. If the market price is below the value of the next ton of
emissions, the firm should emit sulfur dioxide until it is no longer
worthwhile to do so- that is, until the prices matched up. If the price is
above the value of the next ton of emissions, then the firm should have
refrained from emitting the previous ton of sulfur dioxide and instead sold
(or refrained from purchasing) the associated allowance.
This is simply the converse of the abatement-price relationship
described above. This reframing is most useful when considering the
options facing a new firm. A modern, clean power plant can generate a lot
of electricity for each ton of sulfur dioxide that it emits.81 This would lead
the owners of the firm to place a very high value on emission allowances.
This helps to explain why new plants have not had as much trouble
80

Swift, supra note 12, at 331.
Among other things, a new plant faces a lower marginal cost to install clean technology when compared to
an old plant that has to pay for a retrofitting (just as it is cheaper for a more powerful engine to be installed by a
car manufacturer than it is for you to replace the engine that came with the car with something more powerful).
81
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obtaining allowances as some predicted.82 They just naturally place a
higher value on the allowances than do firms that own older plants, which
means that they will be willing to pay the market price for allowances.
3. Options Availability Gives Firms More Choices
Several brokerages offer options contracts for pollution allowances.
These options prices generally conform to the Black Scholes formula83 for
valuing options. This allows power plants to specify an exercise deadline
and strike price to a broker who will then figure out the appropriate price to
charge for the option.
The existence of the options market gives firms an alternative method to
limit their future allowance costs. For example, a firm that usually emits
(and is allocated allowances to cover) one thousand tons of sulfur dioxide
per year could buy one thousand call options with a strike price $10 above
the market price and an expiration date one year in the future. The firm
could then sell the one thousand emission allowances that it was allocated
for that year. The firm can then use the money from this transaction to
benefit the firm for a year before re-purchasing the allowances. The call
options guarantee that they will not have to pay more than $10 above the
current market price when the time comes to cover their emissions
obligation.
4. Non-Polluters Participate for Investment or Idiosyncratic Reasons
A small portion of market activity comes from individuals and firms
that do not emit sulfur dioxide. These individuals can generally be divided
into two groups: environmentalists and investors.
Environmentalists purchase allowances in order to retire them without
emitting any corresponding sulfur dioxide. By doing so, they reduce the
total amount of sulfur dioxide that can ever be emitted under the cap and
trade program. They also have the effect of reducing the supply of
allowances available to the rest of the market, which in theory would result
in higher prices and immediately lower the amount of sulfur dioxide
emitted. However, the relatively tiny volume of such purchases renders any
such effect practically invisible.
82
See Heinzerling, supra note 29, at 331 for an example of concerns about the effects of allowance
allocation on new entrants into the market. An unpublished paper by EPA employees Reid Harvey, Joe Kruger,
and Bill Irving, U.S. Experience with SO2 and NOx Allowance Allocations (9/12/2003), documents the lack of an
observed barrier to new entrants beginning on page 9.
83
The basic idea is that given the current price of an asset, the asset’s volatility, the exercise price of the
option, the date on which the option expires and the prevailing interest rate, a broker can calculate the correct
price for an option. The more financially adventurous can peruse Fischer Black and Myron S. Scholes, The
Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 Journal of Political Economy 637-654 (1973).
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The other group consists of outside investors who buy allowances when
they perceive them to be undervalued, and sell when they perceive them to
be overvalued. In sufficient volume, these investors could act as an
important source of efficiency- both in terms of making the market operate
more efficiently by making it easier to match buyer and seller, and by
keeping power companies in check through providing an independent
source of estimates about the future value of allowances. However, outside
investors also participate in the market at such low volumes that they have
only negligible effects on the market.
5. Drawing Conclusions
These relationship discussed in subparts one and two is useful, but
limited. Given the cost of the last ton of pollution abated, we can determine
the correct price of a pollution allowance. Conversely, given the price of a
pollution allowance, we can deduce the cost of the last ton of pollution
abated. However, this does not tell us what the price of an allowance
should be (or, equivalently, at what price per ton companies should stop
paying for pollution abatement). In order to determine the correct price to
put on a one-ton emission allowance, we must turn to an analysis of the
supply of and demand for emission allowances.
B. Technology and Expectations Affect the Market
Since we know the real world constraints that power companies operate
under, we can estimate the supply and demand for emissions allowances.
However, the market for allowances is different from the norm. The
government introduces 9.5 million tons’ worth of credits into the market
every year, regardless of the existing market conditions.84 Since we know
that not all outstanding allowances are retired each year,85 the supply curve
must be generated by something besides the total existing number of
allowances.
The best way to model the market for pollution allowances is to treat
power plants as both suppliers and consumers of allowances. We can think
of a plant as having a separate “allowance holding” division and “sulfur
dioxide emission” division. Presumably firms would only decide to transfer
allowances between divisions when it is worth more to emit sulfur dioxide
and retire the allowances than it is to continue to hold on to the allowances.
Accordingly, we will treat “demand” as the demand for allowances to retire
84
8.9 million tons are mandated to be allocated by 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a) (2004), and the various bonus
allowances (whose issuance does not depend on market conditions) are described in 42 U.S.C. § 7651d (a)(2)
(2004) and § 7651d (a)(3) (2004).
85
As is visible in the EPA Retired Allowances Database, as well as in the table infra at II.A.2.a.
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by the “sulfur dioxide emission” division, and supply as the willingness of
the “allowance holding” division to give up allowances.
1. Demand
The demand for pollution allowances (to be retired to cover the year’s
emissions) corresponds to the marginal abatement costs at various price
points. That is, the demand for emission allowances at a price of $700 is
equal to the amount of emission that costs more than $700 to abate.
Equivalently, the demand for emission allowances at a price of $300 is
equal to the total amount of emissions such that each ton emitted brings in
more than $300.
Since we know the cost and effectiveness of various forms of pollution
abatement, we can approximate the shape of the demand curve:

At low prices demand is very flexible. The curve starts at the point on
the graph representing the quantity of sulfur dioxide that companies would
emit if there were no restraints on emissions. Once the cost of emission is
above zero, companies will take simple measures to reduce pollution.
These measures can include routine maintenance or switching to lower
sulfur coals.
At moderate prices, the curve is less flexible. At this point companies
will begin to make capital improvements in order to reduce pollution. This
can include modifying boilers to accommodate subbituminous coal or
installing pollution scrubbers.86 These measures start to become cost
effective at prices between $200 and $700 per allowance.87
At high prices the demand curve becomes very inflexible. At these
price points, all of the technological measures for reducing emissions have
86
87

See Swift, supra note 12, at 332 (discussing scrubber costs).
See Swift, supra note 12, at 331.
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been exhausted. The only way to reduce emissions further is to reduce
energy generation. This is very costly- since plants would have already
installed emission reduction technology, they would have to reduce
electricity generation by a lot in order to appreciably reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions.
2. Supply
The supply curve represents allowance holders’ willingness to sell (or to
retire) emission credits. It essentially represents a composite of all market
participants’ guesses as to what the price of an allowance should be, based
primarily on what they think allowances will be worth in the future. The
slope of the supply curve depends on the differences between different
participants’ estimates of the proper value. If the estimates are close
together, then the curve will be very inflexible. If the estimates are far
apart, then the curve will be flexible.88
In any event, the supply curve will move around a lot, since it depends
so heavily on predictions about the future. There are many potential new
events that can significantly change investors’ outlooks on the future.89
These can cause significant changes in the price of allowances.
3. Demand Outlook
The future outlook for demand for allowances depends on how much
sulfur dioxide firms will choose to emit in the future at various price points.
The main factors affecting their choices are (1) how much they can earn for
each unit of electricity produced; and (2) the costs of technological methods
of emissions reduction.
a. Technological Improvements in Abatement Methods
As abatement technology improves, the cost of reducing pollution will
go down. This would cause the entire demand curve to shift down and to
the left, reducing both the price of pollution allowances and the amount of
pollution emitted (assuming the supply curve is held constant).
Technological advances can be difficult to predict. We have already
88
The basic intuition behind this is that if people’s guesses are all very close together, small shifts in price
won’t change the amount supplied (since there won’t be too many people who won’t sell at P1 but will sell at P2).
If guesses are different, the number of people whose decision is changed by the same change in price increases.
This makes the supply curve more flexible.
89
One example is the rules change promoted by the EPA that would devalue future allowances. Interstate
Air Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4630 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 72, 75,
and 96). The more likely such a change appears to be, the more dearly suppliers will hold on to existing
allowances.
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seen some emission reducing methods come into being that were not
predicted before the program began. The reduction in scrubber costs was
unexpected,90 as was the extensive use of subbituminous coal. 91
b. Increased Demand for Electricity
Increased demand for coal-produced electricity would make producers
want to generate more electricity at any given cost. This would shift the
demand curve up and to the right. This would make pollution allowances
more expensive and lead to more sulfur dioxide emissions. As the
population increases and the economy grows, demand for electricity will
naturally increase.
A relative increase in the costs of other methods of producing electricity
(such as an increase in the price of oil) will lead to additional demand for
electricity from coal-fired generators, and an associated increase in
allowance price and emissions. This could cause demand for emission
allowances to change more quickly than overall demand for electricity.
c. Future Direction for Demand
It’s hard to assess which force will be dominant in the long run. The
key issue is whether increasing demand will move the curve until the
inflexible portion is above the annual cap. Is this were to happen, the price
of allowances would rise significantly.
While we don’t know which force (technology or increasing demand)
will win out, there are reasons to believe that industry participants may
overestimate the chances of a demand crunch. The pressure of increased
demand for electricity is easy to see and predict, while technological
progress is always difficult to anticipate. Combined with the inherent
conservatism of power plant management, this could lead to a systematic
overvaluation of allowances.
4. Supply Outlook
a. Recent Price History
Recently, the price of sulfur dioxide emission allowances has jumped
through the roof. The price of an emission allowance on April 1, 2004 was
$272.92 By June 2nd the price was $375,93 and by July 1st the price was
90

Swift, supra note 12, at 332.
Swift, supra note 12, at 392-93.
92
Editors: this information is pulled from the Cantor-Fitzgerald web site (http://www.emissionstrading.com)
and requires that the user register and navigate through some search forms. I am not sure how to cite this info.
91
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$425.94 Since it seems unlikely that the demand for emissions moved so
dramatically over a four-month span, something probably happened to
change suppliers’ outlook on the future value of emissions allowances.
Two factors stand out as contributing to this change in price. First, there
was a general increase in oil prices in the first half of 2004. This increase
made coal power more attractive. To the extent that investors believed this
increase to be permanent, they would become much less willing to part with
emissions allowances. The other factor affecting the price of emissions
allowances springs from a rule proposed by the EPA in January.95
b. The Unintended Consequence of Devaluing Future Allowances
The Interstate Air Quality Rule proposed by the EPA calls for a
dramatic reduction in the sulfur dioxide emissions cap starting in 2010.96
The basic proposal is to require firms to use more than one allowance for
each ton of sulfur dioxide emitted.97 The devaluation would not apply to
allowances that have a vintage year prior to 2010.98
Devaluing future allowances while leaving current allowances
untouched makes current allowances more valuable. In a manner similar to
firms’ behavior under Phase I of the program, firms may start hoarding
Phase II credits for use (or sale) when they are more valuable under the
more stringent regime. The current market price for allowances may reflect
the market’s guess as to the likelihood of the Interstate Air Quality Rule’s
enactment as much as it represents anything else.
IV. OBSTACLES TO THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE MARKET
This section explores some features of the existing market in sulfur
dioxide allowance that should be fixed. In order to recognize problems we
must first separate out the good features of the market from the bad. The
first section of this part will describe what the market would look like in an
93

Also from http://www.emissionstrading.com
Also from http://www.emissionstrading.com
95
Interstate Air Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4630 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 51, 72, 75, and 96). Now known as the Clean Air Interstate Rule. See 69 Fed. Reg. 28874. The comment
period for the law ended on March 30, 2004. Interstate Air Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4630 (proposed Jan.
30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 72, 75, and 96). Hearings have been held on supplemental proposals
to the rule. 69 Fed. Reg. 28874. Final action on the rule is scheduled for November. Unified Agenda, June 28,
2004, Environmental Protection Agency, 69 Fed. Reg. 38197. The Clear Skies Act in Congress was the first
attempt to implement this standard- since it is now stalled, the EPA is attempting to enact administratively what
the Administration failed to achieve legislatively. See Id.
96
Interstate Air Quality Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4630 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 51, 72, 75, and 96).
97
Id. at 4632. Specifically, the proposal is that (1) pre-2010 allowances may be used at a one-to-one ratio;
(2) 2010 to 2014 allowances may be used at a two-to-one ratio; and (3) post-2015 allowances may be used at a
three-to-one-ratio.
98
Id.
94
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ideal world (of course, the hypothetical world is not so ideal that all
pollution has been eradicated). Any departure from that ideal is a problem.
These problems are then divided into two groups: qualitative problems and
quantitative problems.
Qualitative problems are problems whose effects are hard to quantify.
We can identify them as undesirable features of the market, but the only
solution is to eradicate them directly- we can’t attempt to indirectly cancel
out their effects, because their effects are unpredictable. The two examples
of these types of problems explored here are the agency costs imposed by
the divergence of power plant managements’ interests and
shareholder/ratepayer value, and the disruption caused by political meddling
(or potential meddling) in the market.
Quantitative problems are problems whose effects can be quantified.
Since we can figure out the effects of the problem relatively easily, we can
develop a variety of ways to counteract these effects. The one example of
this type of problem discussed here is the market distortion caused by the
capital gains tax.
Part V will explore potential solutions to the distortion created by the
capital gains tax.
A. The Ideal Emissions Allowance Market
The ideal emissions market is efficient. It is populated by rational
profit-maximizing actors who all face the same market price. Property
rights are secure- an allowance that entitles the holder to emit one ton of
sulfur dioxide in 2015 is guaranteed to allow him to emit one ton of sulfur
dioxide in 2015 or beyond, as he chooses.
An efficient market where everybody faces the same market price
ensures that everybody will have the same incentive to abate emissions.
What this means in turn is that everybody will abate emissions up to the
same maximum marginal cost. This is important because if two people stop
their abatement at different marginal costs, then society is spending more
than it has to in order to reach the current level of emissions (if one
participant emits a ton that would have cost him $251 to abate, while
another participant spends $300 to abate one ton of emissions, then society
has just wasted $49).
The requirement that all participants be rational profit-maximizers is
just the next step of this reasoning. When confronted with the same
incentive, not all people will react the same way. However, all rational
profit-maximizers will react the same way when they are confronted with
the same incentive. This helps to avoid the problem noted above where
firms stop their abatement at different marginal cost levels.
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Because the market price is heavily based on predictions about the
future, it is possible to glean information (or at least power generating
firms’ best guesses at information) from the current price of an allowance.
Ideally, the market price would give us a good guess as to the future
direction of abatement technology development and future demand for
electricity. If there is a chance that the government could interfere with the
property right associated with an allowance, then that chance must also be
priced in to its value. Pricing in the risk of government interference
obscures the other, more practically useful, information that we would like
to obtain.
In the ideal market, society spends the least possible amount of money
to reach its chosen level of sulfur dioxide emissions (or, equivalently, it
reaps the most possible benefit from the amount of sulfur dioxide that it
emits). The ideal market also allows us to see at a glance the consensus
estimate for future costs of abatement, and to make decisions based on that
information.
B. Qualitative Problems with the Sulfur Dioxide Market
1. Institutional Characteristics of Power Companies
The structure of the power generation industry creates two different
problems that impede the efficient operation of the market. One problem
comes from the regulations controlling the disposition of any profits firms
earn from trading allowance. The other problem stems from agency costs
arising from the divergence of interests between power plant management
and power plant shareholders (or ratepayers, who are often the equivalent of
shareholders in the heavily regulated power industry).
Most power plants are locally regulated monopolies, and most local
regulations classify costs associated with emission allowances as fuel
costs.99 This means that any profits or losses incurred as a result of
allowance trading must be passed on to consumers.100
This rule weakens firms’ incentives to make profitable trades. Since
their only reward is ratepayers’ gratitude, they will not be as aggressive as
they would if the reward for success were money on the balance sheet. It
also probably leads to a risk averse style of trading. Consumers will be
more angered by an increase in power rates than they will be pleased by a
similar sized decrease in rates.
Risk averse behavior by itself does not cause any problems in the
operation of the market. Rational firms can buy or sell options to help
99

Ellerman et al., supra note 22, at 193.
Id.
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protect them against the risk of an increase in allowance prices. However,
the behavior observed above,101 where firms stockpile excess allowances
year after year, is not rational.102
One explanation for this behavior is that it is a manifestation of the
divergence of interests between power plant managers and power plant
owners. Holding on to a large number of allowances represents a large
financial risk, as the value of allowance is very volatile. Changing the
firm’s holdings (by, for example, selling excess allowances and buying
options to protect against an increase in allowance prices) would reduce the
firm’s financial risk.
However, exposing the company to the risk of holding excess
allowances does not require that any particular person take the blame.
Changing the firm’s holdings would require one person to take action, and
therefore responsibility. While he would reduce the firm’s overall risk, his
action could still lead to bad results. Since the trades have little upside (as
any gain must be passed on to customers), but a potentially disastrous
downside (as the trader could be seen as the sole person responsible for an
increase in power rates), the wise bureaucrat will avoid taking action.
Inaction by power plant traders does impede the efficient operation of
the market. When firms have a bias against trading, they don’t turn their
excess allowances into cash. This lack of direct feedback could cause them
to pass up worthwhile abatement opportunities.
2. Political Interference in the Operation of the Market
As mentioned earlier, the Interstate Air Quality Rule proposed by the
EPA calls for devaluing future emissions allowances (every two tons of
2010-2014 vintage allowances and every three tons of post-2015 vintage
allowances will only allow firms to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide). If this
rule were enacted, it would cause current allowances (which would not be
devalued) to become much more valuable. There is some evidence that the
mere possibility of this rule coming in to force has already caused
allowances to increase in value.
We would like for the market price of an allowance to reflect
participants’ best guesses about future technological progress and future
demand for electricity. When the possibility of political interference in the
market arises, the price also inevitably reflects participants’ guesses about
101

Infra page 16-17.
This behavior is only rational if every stockpiling firm feels that rising allowance prices are a lead pipe
cinch. But in an efficient market it is impossible for all of the participants to think that the market price is too
low. Some person who thinks the price is too low will offer to buy somebody else’s allowances for slightly above
the market price. If all of the potential sellers think that the price is too low, they’ll refuse to sell. So the buyer
will have to offer more money. This will be repeated until a sale takes place, setting the new market price.
102
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political outcomes. While that may be interesting, it is not helpful to
observers who would like to know the approximate cost of reducing
marginal emissions based on a stable cap.
This sort of action also poses a direct threat to the operation of the
futures market. Futures markets can be very helpful in predicting the future
value of commodities. When the government shows a willingness to step in
and directly devalue future interests it deters investors from participating in
the market.
This type of government interference in the market does not threaten the
efficient operation of the market as regards abatement decision making. It
will not prevent firms from trading until only the highest cost abaters are
emitting sulfur dioxide. However, it does obscure important information
that could be conveyed through the market price of an allowance.
Although the information that the market price could convey is
valuable, it is also valuable to reduce pollution. Legislators may simply
have to weigh which value is more important. Although it might be
possible to achieve both goals (such as by committing to only reducing the
cap through market transactions), a full exploration of that possibility is
beyond the scope of this Article.
C. Quantitative Problems with the Sulfur Dioxide Market
1. The Capital Gains Tax
The capital gains tax103 provides a clear example of a distortion of
market incentives. While power plant agency problems and uncertainty
about government interference in the market provide reasons that actors in
the market may choose not to make economically beneficial transactions,
the capital gains tax actually renders some economically beneficial
transactions worthless.
Because emission allowances are given to firms for free, they are
recorded as assets with a cost of $0.104 This means that when a firm sells
part of its initial allocation of credits, the entire proceeds of the sale count as
capital gains (presumably long-term capital gains, as all allowances of all
vintages should have been deposited in their owner’s accounts by 2000). So
a firm that sells part of its initial allocation of allowances receives only 85%
of its value, as the other 15%105 goes to the IRS. A simple example will
suffice to show how this distorts firms’ incentives.
103
See Rev. Rul. 92-16, 1992-1 C.B. 15 (describing the tax status of allowances). Basically, allowances do
not create taxable income when they are first given to firms, but they have a zero cost basis for the purpose of the
capital gains tax when sold.
104
Id.
105
Editors: This is the current long term capital gains tax.
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Consider Albert’s coal-fired power plant. This plant has some unusual
characteristics. When it is running flat out it generates one thousand tons of
sulfur dioxide emissions per year. Albert can reduce these emissions, but at
a gradually increasing marginal cost. Reducing emissions by one ton would
cost him one dollar. Reducing emissions by another ton would cost him
two dollars. In general, abating the Nth ton of emissions would cost Albert
N dollars.
In both scenarios presented below, the price of a one-ton emission
allowance is $50. The amount of allowances that Albert buys or sells will
not affect the market price- he is a price taker.
In our first scenario, Albert has had one thousand emission allowances
allocated to him for every vintage year until 2025. We would like to see
Albert reduce his emissions by fifty tons. That would get him to the point
where the marginal cost of reducing pollution by another ton ($51) exceeds
the value that society has put on doing so ($50). However, Albert does not
receive the full $50 in value for each ton of emissions that he abates. He
receives $50 less the 15% capital gains tax, or $42.50. Accordingly, he will
only reduce his emissions by forty-two tons- the point at which the cost to
him of further reduction ($43) exceeds the benefit he receives by doing so
($42.50). This leads to Albert inefficiently over-emitting sulfur dioxide.
Albert’s emissions level is inefficient because his emission decision is
being driven by the fact that he has been allocated allowances. Compare his
decision here with the decision of someone owning an identical plant (call
him Bert) that has not had any allowances allocated to him.
In this scenario, Bert has to buy allowances to cover any sulfur dioxide
that he emits over the course of the year. For each ton of pollution that he
emits, he has to decide if it is more expensive to spend $50 for a pollution
allowance, or to spend the money that it would cost to abate the pollution.
It is clear that he will choose to abate pollution until the cost of abatement is
over $50. This will lead him to abate fifty tons of pollution- a different
amount than he would have emitted had he been allocated credits.
When different market participants do not all reach the same marginal
costs of abatement, money is being wasted. In the previous scenario, a total
of ninety-two tons of emissions have been abated. The efficient way to do
this would have been for both Albert and Bert to abate forty-six tons.106
Instead, Albert only abated forty-two tons, and Bert spent $47, $48, $49,
and $50 to abate an extra four tons (instead of Albert spending $43, $44,
$45, and $46). Society is worse off by $16, and has been presented with an
artificially high cost of abatement- it appears that a price of $50 is required
to induce ninety-two tons of abatement, when it should only require a
106
Note that the efficiency springs from equalizing the marginal costs, rather than equalizing the amount
abated. The two are only equivalent here because by hypothesis both of the plants involved are identical.
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market price of $46.
The preceding analysis posits a world in which each market participant
operates a single power plant. In the real world, of course, many
participants own multiple power plants. However, this does not change the
analysis. Since intra-firm trading is free, it is reasonable to think of a multiplant firm as simply operating one really big firm, and to aggregate the
abatement costs of all of the plants owned by a firm.107
Bert’s scenario does suggest one way of getting around the problem of
the capital gains tax- simply stop handing allowances out for free. If
companies have to pay for each allowance that they use, they will indeed
reduce their output to the efficient level. However, this would be a drastic
step to take- at the current price of $600 per allowance,108 and a cap level of
approximately nine and a half million tons,109 this would be a 5.7 billion
dollar annual hit to the power industry. In any event, such a proposal would
probably be politically impossible to implement,110 so it would behoove us
to come up with a more subtle way of achieving the efficient result.
V. FIXING QUANTITATIVE MARKET DISTORTION
This Part will explore potential solutions to the incentive distortion
created by the capital gains tax. There are two key attributes to any good
solution to this problem. First, it should equalize abatement incentives
between firms that are allocated allowances and firms that are not. And
secondly, it should be revenue neutral towards the power industry as a
whole. This second goal should make the solution more politically viable,
as it makes it less likely that the solution will be seen as either a giveaway
to power companies or a drag on our nation’s economy.
A. Repealing the Capital Gains Tax for Allowances
Repealing the capital gains tax would undoubtedly solve the problems
caused by the capital gains tax. Although it is unrealistic to talk about a
complete repeal of the tax, a targeted repeal would suffice to fix the
problem. Congress could pass a law mandating some artificially high cost
basis for emission allocations, or simply exempt them from the capital gains
107
Imagine Albert owned two plants: one can abate one ton of emissions for $2 and two tons for $5; the
other can abate one ton of emissions for $3 and two tons for $7. From an abatement perspective, we can treat this
situation as if Albert owned one plant that can abate one ton of emissions for $2, two tons for $5, three tons for $8,
and four tons for $12.
108
Editors: Again, this data comes from http://www.emissionstrading.com
109
The amount of allowances distributed throughout Phase II, per the EPA Compliance Report of 2002.
110
Judging from the failure to pass a national tax on electricity to pay for emissions reductions, which would
have entailed a similar hit to the power industry. C.f. Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, The Political
Economy of Market Based Environmental Policy, 41 J.L. & Econ. 37, 69.
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tax altogether.
The problem with this proposal is that it would result in a huge windfall
for the power industry. Even setting aside any distributional issues that this
would raise, it would result in considerable political difficulties in passing
this measure (environmental groups are uneasy enough with the existence
of a “right to pollute” even when it isn’t coupled with a blatant tax
giveaway). In addition, there is no easy way to offset this windfall and
make a proposal involving repealing the capital gains tax be revenue
neutral.
It is possible that environmental groups would accept the repeal of the
tax if it were coupled with a more stringent future cap, or with some other
environment-friendly proposal.
This author must confess his total
ignorance as to what sort of deal is either possible or likely to fall out of this
sort of political horse-trading. Accordingly, the rest of this section will look
for a way to neutralize the windfall to the power companies without
affecting any other programs or policies.
There is no doubt that the government can recapture wealth from the
power industry. This could be accomplished either by charging a fee for the
redemption of allowances or by instituting a tax targeted at participants in
the emissions market. The difficulty is in figuring out how much wealth the
government should recapture in order to balance out the effects of repealing
the capital gains tax- and how it can collect this wealth without introducing
new market distorting incentives.
The first issue is whether the tax should be set to collect an amount
equal to a percentage of firms’ actual capital gains, or equal to the capital
gains tax that would have been collected but for the tax exemption provided
for emission allowances.111 The power industry would argue that the
windfall only consists of the actual money that the government would have
otherwise collected. Opponents could argue in response that every trade in
which somebody records a capital gain and does not get taxed represents its
own windfall. This would be a highly contentious argument, and practical
difficulties would remain even after the argument was settled.112
Since collecting tax revenues through a counterfactual world construct
is probably not workable, the government would have to attempt to
recapture a fixed percentage of firms’ realized capital gains from
allowances. In order to recover the money without reintroducing the bad
incentives created by the capital gains tax, any new tax must be levied
against power generating firms in general. This would mean that firms that
111
The two will quickly diverge because of the increased incentive to realize capital gains created by
removing the tax.
112
In particular, if one were to try to recover the capital gains that would have been collected but for the tax
repeal, one would have to somehow design a counterfactual world- and then try to collect a tax based on it, which
would be unusual.
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are allocated allowances for free from the government would have the
ability to impose costs on other firms by realizing capital gains. This is not
a desirable side effect.
Repealing the capital gains tax would certainly fix the efficiency
problems created by the capital gains tax. However, the proposal would be
politically difficult to enact- and any technical change made to alleviate that
political difficulty creates more problems than it would solve.
B. Charging a Universal Retirement Fee
The problem we face is that the capital gains tax makes the option of
selling allowances less attractive than it should be compared to using the
allowances. As discussed above, it is impractical to address this problem by
making the option of selling allowances more attractive by repealing the
capital gains tax. We are left with the option of making it less attractive to
retire allowances.
One way to do this would be to charge a fee to all companies for retiring
emission allowances. This approach has the advantage of treating all
market participants and all emission allowances the same way. It would
also turn the Title IV system into a sort of hybrid between cap and trade and
a straight emissions tax, which could be interesting. Unfortunately, it does
not address the incentive mismatch problem.
Consider Albert, our power plant owner. His plant will emit one
thousand tons of sulfur dioxide if he spends no money on pollution
abatement. He can abate one ton of emissions by spending $1; he can abate
another ton of emissions by spending $2 more, and in general abating the
Nth ton of emissions will cost him N dollars. The price of a one-ton
emission allowance is $300, and the fee for retiring each allowance is $45.
Albert has had one thousand allowances allocated to him. For each ton
of emissions that he abates, Albert can sell an allowance for $300, receiving
$255 after taxes. He also avoids a $45 fee, so he will take any abatement
steps that cost less than $300, which would lead him to emit 700 tons of
sulfur dioxide.
Contrast that with Bert’s behavior. Bert has a power plant that is
identical to Albert’s, but Bert has not been allocated any allowances by the
government. He will have to spend $300 to buy an allowance for each ton
of sulfur dioxide that he emits, and an additional $45 fee per ton to retire the
allowance. Accordingly, he will abate until it costs him more than $345 to
do so. This leaves him emitting 655 tons of pollution, which means he has
spent too much on abatement.113
113
Note that the over-expenditure here does not necessarily mean that the environment will be made better
off by charging a universal fee for allowance retirement. The likely result of such a fee is for the market price of
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As these examples show, charging a universal fee for retiring emission
credits does not fix the distortion caused by the capital gains tax.
Companies that are allocated emission credits still have an incentive to emit
more sulfur dioxide than do companies that have to buy credits.
Since this doesn’t solve the incentive distortion problem, we don’t need
to worry about the distributional effects of the proposal.
C. Charging a Flat Autarchic Fee
In order to fix a problem that affects companies that receive allowance
allocations, we should charge a fee that targets companies that use their
initial allocation to cover their emissions obligations.
Accordingly, let’s consider the rational response for various actors in
the market to a $45 fee that is charged for retiring an allowance that was
originally allocated to the company retiring it. We will use Albert and Bert
from the previous example, and a market price of $300 per allowance.
Albert was originally allocated one thousand allowances, and he will be
charged a $45 fee for each allowance retired. For each allowance he sells,
he receives $300 less fifteen percent, or $255. He also avoids paying a $45
fee. This means that his income from abatement (ignoring the cost of
abatement) is $300- the $255 gain and the avoidance of the $45 loss.
Accordingly, he will abate pollution until further abatement would cost him
more than $300, leaving him emitting 700 tons.
Bert was not allocated any allowances, so he will have to pay $300 to
buy an allowance for each ton of sulfur dioxide that he wants to emit.
Accordingly, he will abate until further abatement costs more than $300, so
that he will emit 700 tons of sulfur dioxide.
This indicates that a fee targeting autarchic behavior will put firms that
have not been allocated credits on an equal footing with firms that have not.
This will allow trading until the most efficient emission behavior is taking
place.114 The problem with this proposal arises from the fact that the price
of allowances is not constant.115 Consider what would happen if the price
were to rise to $400 per ton.
Now Albert will be able to sell an allowance for $400 for each ton he
abates. After taxes, he will gain $340 plus $45 for the fee that he avoids
paying. Accordingly, he will abate until the cost of abatement exceeds
$385 per ton, emitting 615 tons of sulfur dioxide.
allowances to fall by the amount of the fee and for emitter behavior to remain the same. The lower market price
might make it easier for environmental groups to purchase and retire allowances, but their effect on the market is
generally minimal.
114
This is an example of Coase’s Theorem at work. See generally Coase, supra note 75. Of course, the
other imperfections in the market discussed above would still exist. This is only a solution for the problem
created by the capital gains tax.
115
The price has in fact been quite volatile. See the EPA Compliance report for 2002, page 6.
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Bert, since he has to buy an allowance for every ton that he emits, will
abate until the cost exceeds $400. This would leave him emitting 600 tons.
The mismatch between firms that receives allowances and firms that do not
has reappeared. 116
Again, this proposal fails to completely address the incentive distortion
problem. Accordingly, its distributional effects are irrelevant.
D. Charging a Proportional Autarchic Fee
We can solve this problem by tying the amount of the fee to the market
price of an allowance. Suppose we charge firms 15% of the market value of
the autarchic allowances that they redeem. We will again use Albert and
Bert to illustrate the resulting behavior.
Albert’s response will now vary precisely with the market price for
allowances. No matter what the market price is, the amount that Albert
receives for selling an allowance will be equal to eighty-five percent of the
market price (due to the capital gains tax). He will also save an amount
equal to fifteen percent of the market price by avoiding the fee. This means
that his gain from abatement (ignoring the costs of abating) will be equal to
(.85 times the market price) plus (.15 times the market price)- that is, his
gain will exactly equal the market price for an allowance. This means that
he will abate pollution until the marginal cost of abatement is equal to the
market price.
Bert, who is not allocated any allowances, is not affected by the fee.
The only incentive he faces is the market price, which means that he will
also abate until the marginal cost of further abatement is equal to the market
price for an allowance.
Charging a percentage fee for autarchic redemption will equalize the
emission incentives facing firms that are allocated free allowances and firms
that are not. Since they would be trading on an equal footing, allowances
would wind up with the firms that valued them the highest.117 This in turn
would mean that we as a society are getting the maximum value possible for
each ton of sulfur dioxide emitted. The incentive distortion problem has
disappeared.
However, as industry lobbyists would be quick to point out, a new
problem has taken its place. Specifically, the power industry will be
experiencing a direct loss of wealth to the tune of $360,000,000.00 a

116
There is an exception, since firms can always avoid the fee by selling their allowances and buying
identical allowances from other firms. This means that if the fee were set at an absurdly high amount we would
see efficient behavior, as everybody would exchange their allowances, taking the capital gains hit instead of
paying the autarchy fee. At that point the fee is not really a fee so much as it is a mandate to sell.
117
Again, this is an application of Coase’s Theorem. See infra note 112.
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year.118 The power industry’s loss would be the EPA’s gain- and since
revenues on that scale would represent about 4% of the agency’s budget,119
we would probably want to pre-allocate the funds somewhere even if we
weren’t concerned with canceling out the distributional effects of the
proposal.
Fortunately, it is relatively simple to neutralize the loss suffered by the
industry because of the autarchy fee. The EPA can simply distribute the fee
income out to participants in the market based on their relative level of
power production. This would not introduce any new incentives (except for
increasing incentives to produce power while reducing emissions, which
seems ok).
This solution is not free of political drawbacks, of course. It would
represent a redistribution of wealth from firms that are allocated allowances
by the government to firms that were not. This is not unfair in any
subjective sense in light of the fact that the original allocation of allowances
represented a wealth transfer from firms that were not allocated allowance
to firms that were. To the extent that firms receiving allowances oppose
this proposal, the combined efforts of firms not receiving allowances (who
are distributional winners) and environmental groups (who want to improve
the efficiency of the sulfur dioxide market in order to be able to impose
more stringent caps) should be effective counterweights.
E. Consequences of a Proportionate Autarchy Fee System
1. Comparative Dynamics
Thus far we have been comparing the reaction to various fees as if the
price of allowances were unaffected by the fee. Of course, this is not
accurate. By introducing the autarchy fee we will make allowances less
valuable to the firms to which they are initially allocated. This will result in
a reduction in the price of an emission allowance. However, the price
should not fall enough to make the new price less than the old price minus
the autarchy fee.
In the end, emitting sulfur dioxide will be more attractive to firms that
have not been allocated allowances by the government, and less attractive to
those firms that have. These comparisons are made assuming that
everything else in the market remains constant. The total level of emissions
should remain constant, but the source of emissions should shift somewhat
from firms that were allocated allowances to firms that were not. This state
118
Assuming a 15% fee, the current market price of $600, and that autarchic retirement is reduced to 4
million tons from the current level of 6.3 million tons.
119
3.9%
of
the
2003
budget
of
7.7
billion
(EPA
Budget
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/budget/2003/2003bib.pdf).
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of affairs would represent a decrease in the amount spent on emission
abatement with no corresponding increase in the amount of emissions
abated.
The change in market equilibrium may be easier to understand if
numbers are attached to the variables described above. Before providing
these numbers in the following scenario, I would like to emphasize that they
are completely made up, and should not be used by anyone as the basis for
any kind of real money investment or prediction.
Suppose that the market price for allowances is $300, and the capital
gains tax is 15%. Firms that are allocated allowance will abate until the
marginal cost of abatement is $255, while firms that are not allocated
allowances will abate until the marginal cost of abatement is $300. Now we
enact a law that charges a fee equal to 15% of the market price when an
allowance is retired by the firm to which it was originally assigned.
This will result in a drop in the market price- let’s say to $280 (the
actual drop will depend on the proportion of the allowances previously
being used in an autarchic manner). Now firms that were not allocated
allowances will only abate until the cost of abatement is $280- they will
emit more sulfur dioxide. However, firms that were allocated allowances
will also abate until the cost of abatement is $280- they will emit less sulfur
dioxide. Since nothing has changed in the factors underlying supply and
demand, the total amount of sulfur dioxide emitted should be approximately
the same. The difference is that society is spending less money to achieve
the same level of abatement- and that reducing the cap further, whether
through market action or through allowance devaluation, will be easier than
it was before the fee was enacted.
2. Market Response to High Fees
The highest bracket of the capital gains tax120 will set an upper limit on
the autarchy fee. If the fee rate is set above the capital gains rate, firms will
simply sell their allocation of allowances (taking the tax hit) and buy an
equivalent number of allowances from another firm. This does limit the
amount of money that can be collected from this program. However, the
point of the fee is not to collect money but rather to fix the market distortion
created by the capital gains tax- and if firms are voluntarily incurring the
capital gains tax hit, then the market distortion caused by the capital gains
tax is clearly gone.
3. Inefficiencies Created by Treating Allowances Differently
120

Currently 15%.
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This program will create a deadweight loss of transactional efficiency
because emission allowances can no longer be treated as interchangeable.
Any time a firm buys allowances on the market, they would have to make
sure that they aren’t buying allowances that had originally been allocated to
them. This will make it more difficult to conduct transactions, and will
probably result in a slight increase in broker fees.
4. Improving Environmental Standards
The result of this proposal would be to reduce the costs to the power
industry of complying with sulfur dioxide emissions regulations. However,
there is also an environmental payoff from enacting this rule. From the
environmentalists’ point of view, increased efficiency means that a more
stringent cap can be imposed on power companies that inflicts the same
amount of total costs. To the extent that regulation decisions are driven by
the costs of implementation, a more efficient market will lead to more
stringent regulation.

CONCLUSION
The sulfur dioxide emissions allowances market responds to supply and
demand just like any other market. Power companies respond to the price
signals by abating pollution.
Some firms do not respond appropriately to these price signals. Some
of this happens because of the conservative nature of power firms’
management, and is not susceptible to a national solution. However, a very
easily identifiable portion of this market distortion comes from the effects
of the capital gains tax.
Because allocated allowances are treated as having a zero cost basis,
firms that receive allowances from the government are reluctant to sell.
This reluctance could be overcome either by making it more attractive to
sell the allowances or by making it less attractive to use them. As this
Article has shown, assessing a percentage-based fee for retirement of an
allowance by the company which originally received the allowance will
cancel out the disincentive provided by the capital gains tax, allowing the
market to work more efficiently.
The efficient operation of the emissions market is in everybody’s best
interest. The operation of the market directly drives power companies’
decisions about how much sulfur dioxide to emit. When the market is
operating efficiently, we know that we as a society are wringing the
maximum possible benefit out of each ton of sulfur dioxide that is released
into the atmosphere.

38

Jacob Kreutzer
***

[15-Aug-04

